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Quantum private comparison protocol without a third party
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
To evade the well-known impossibility of unconditionally secure quantum two-party computations,
previous quantum private comparison protocols have to adopt a third party. Here we study how
far we can go with two parties only. We propose a very feasible and efficient protocol. Intriguingly,
although the average amount of information leaked cannot be made arbitrarily small, we find that
it never exceeds 14 bits for any length of the bit-string being compared.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Mn, 03.67.Ac, 03.65.Ta
I. INTRODUCTION
Private comparison, a.k.a. the socialist millionaire
problem [1], is a two-party cryptographic task in which
two millionaires Alice and Bob want to determine if their
wealth a and b are equal, without revealing their actual
wealth. It is analogous to a more general problem whose
goal is to compare two numbers a and b, without re-
vealing any extra information on their values other than
what can be inferred from the comparison result. As a
typical example of secure multi-party computations, this
problem plays an essential role in cryptography. It has
many applications in e-commerce and data mining where
people need to compare numbers which are confidential.
Nevertheless, it is well-known that unconditionally se-
cure quantum two-party secure computations are impos-
sible [2–7], i.e., the dishonest party can always obtain a
non-trivial amount of information on the secret data of
the other party. Quantum private comparison (QPC) is
also covered. To circumvent the problem, almost all ex-
isting QPC protocols ([8–25] and the references therein)
added a third party to help Alice and Bob accomplish the
comparison. The only exception is Ref. [26], in which
such a third party is absent. But it was later found to
be insecure [25, 27] because the secret data of the hon-
est party will always be exposed completely to the other
party.
While quantum cryptography has displayed promising
power in many fields such as quantum key distribution
[28], it is depressing if it cannot give a good solution to
this simple problem. Also, involving a third party is un-
doubtfully less convenient for the practical applications
of QPC. Thus it brings us to the question “what can we
achieve for QPC when it is limited to two parties only?”
Here we will propose such a protocol, in which only a
very small amount of information on the secret data
being compared will be leaked to the dishonest party.
Therefore, despite that it is not unconditionally secure,
it reaches a very useful security level and the elimina-
tion of the third party highly enhances the convenience
of QPC. As there was very little progress made during
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the last decade in the realm ruled out by the existing
impossibility proofs [2–7], we can expect our protocol to
play more important roles in the practical applications
of multi-party secure computations.
II. OUR PROTOCOL
Let H(x) be a classical hash function which is a 1-to-
1 mapping between the n-bit strings x and y = H(x)
(i.e., H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n). Denote the two orthogo-
nal states of a qubit as |0〉0 and |1〉0, respectively, and
define |0〉1 ≡ (|0〉0 + |1〉0)/
√
2, |1〉1 ≡ (|0〉0 − |1〉0)/
√
2.
That is, the subscript σ = 0, 1 in |γ〉σ stands for two
incommutable measurement bases, while γ = 0, 1 distin-
guishes the two states in the same basis. We propose the
following protocol.
The QPC Protocol (for comparing Alice’s n-bit string
a ≡ a1a2...an and Bob’s n-bit string b ≡ b1b2...bn):
(1) Using the hash function H(x), Alice calculates the
n-bit string hA ≡ hA1 hA2 ...hAn = H(a), and Bob calculates
the n-bit string hB ≡ hB1 hB2 ...hBn = H(b).
(2) From i = 1 to n, Alice and Bob compare hA and
hB bit-by-bit as follows.
If i is odd, then:
(2.1A) Alice randomly picks a bit γAi ∈ {0, 1}
and sends Bob a qubit in the state
∣∣γAi 〉hA
i
.
(2.2A) Bob measures it in the hBi basis and
obtains the result
∣∣γBi 〉hB
i
. He announces γBi while keep-
ing hBi secret.
(2.3A) Alice announces γAi .
If i is even, then:
(2.1B) Bob randomly picks a bit γBi ∈ {0, 1}
and sends Alice a qubit in the state
∣∣γBi 〉hB
i
.
(2.2B) Alice measures it in the hAi basis and
obtains the result
∣∣γAi 〉hA
i
. She announces γAi while keep-
ing hAi secret.
(2.3B) Bob announces γBi .
(2.4) If γAi 6= γBi , then they conclude that a 6= b,
and abort the protocol immediately without comparing
the rest bits of hA and hB. Otherwise they continue with
the next i.
2(3) If Alice and Bob find γAi = γ
B
i for all i = 1, ..., n
then they conclude that a = b.
III. CORRECTNESS
In step (2) of the protocol, when |γi〉hi is measured in
the basis hi, the results will always be γi. But if it is mea-
sured in a different basis h¯i, both the results γi and γ¯i can
occur with the equal probabilities 1/2. Therefore, when
Alice and Bob input the same secret data a = b, there
will be hAi = h
B
i and thus γ
A
i = γ
B
i for all i = 1, ..., n, so
that the protocol will always output the correct compar-
ison result. On the other hand, if a 6= b, the hash values
H(a) and H(b) will be different too. As H(a) and H(b)
distribute randomly in {0, 1}n, the case that they have j
(j ∈ [1, n]) different bits will occur with probability
pj =
(
n
j
)
/(2n − 1). (1)
Consequently, in each of the corresponding j rounds of
step (2), the qubit will be prepared in the state |γi〉hi
while being measured in the basis h¯i, and has probability
1/2 to give the result γ¯i, causing the protocol to abort
and output the correct comparison result a 6= b. The only
exception is that all these j qubits still give the result γi
though measured in the basis h¯i. In this case the protocol
will incorrectly output the result a = b while they are
actually inequal. This will occur with probability (1/2)j.
Summing over all possible j values, the total probability
for getting an incorrect comparison result is
pinc =
n∑
j=1
pj
(
1
2
)j
=
n∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
1
(2n − 1)2j . (2)
Therefore, our protocol is not an ideal one. Fortunately,
in practical applications n is generally very high, so that
pinc will be very close to 0. For example, when compar-
ing two 32-bit strings (i.e., n = 32), the above equation
shows that the incorrect comparison result occurs with
probability pinc ≃ 0.01% only.
Also, if the protocol finally outputs a = b in step (3)
but Alice and Bob want to further verify this result, they
can replace a and b with a ⊕ s and b ⊕ s, respectively,
and run the entire protocol all over again from step (1).
Here s is a random n-bit string chosen by either party
and announced to the other party. Then whether a in-
deed equals b will be judged more precisely so that the
probability pinc for finally getting a wrong comparison
result will be further reduced. But it is obvious that the
price is that more information on the secret data a and b
will be leaked as they are reused in the protocol for many
times. For simplicity, in the following we merely study
the amount of information leaked when the protocol is
run only once.
IV. SECURITY
There is surely no security problem to consider when
a = b, because both parties naturally know the secret
data of each other from the comparison result. Now let us
study how much information is leaked when the protocol
outputs a 6= b.
An important feature of our protocol is that, if it
aborts after running m (1 ≤ m ≤ n) rounds of step (2),
the last n −m bits of hA and hB will not be compared
any more. They will not be encoded with qubits and
transferred in the protocol at all. Thus it is obvious that
these bits remain completely secret to the other party. As
a consequence, the amount of mutual information leaked
to each party is m bits at the most.
To increase m, a dishonest party surely wants to make
the protocol abort as late as possible. Therefore, if Alice
(Bob) cheats, in each of the odd (even) rounds of step
(2.3) she (he) will always announce γAi = γ
B
i even if the
actual result is γAi 6= γBi , so that the protocol will never
abort in these rounds. In each of the rest k ≡ m/2 even
rounds (for dishonest Alice) or k ≡ (m+1)/2 odd rounds
(for dishonest Bob) among the first m rounds of step
(2), the cheater has to announce γi in step (2.2) before
the other party does so in step (2.3). Since he wishes
to announce a value that satisfies γAi = γ
B
i so that the
protocol will not abort, he needs to guess the γi value
of the qubit state |γi〉hi that the other party sent him in
step (2.1). That is, he needs to distinguish between the
density matrices ργi=0 ≡ (|0〉hi=0 〈0|+ |0〉hi=1 〈0|)/2 and
ργi=1 ≡ (|1〉hi=0 〈1| + |1〉hi=1 〈1|)/2. Calculations show
that the maximal probability for distinguishing these two
density matrices is
pmax = cos
2(pi/8) ≃ 0.8536. (3)
Therefore, the dishonest party can force each of these
k rounds to continue with probability pmax at the most.
Consequently, the probability for the protocol to abort at
the mth round (i.e., it happens to continue for the first
k − 1 even (odd) rounds while aborts at the k-th even
(odd) round when Alice (Bob) cheats) is
pmabort = p
k−1
max(1− pmax) = cos2(k−1)(pi/8) sin2(pi/8). (4)
That is, with probability pmabort the protocol will abort at
the mth round, and the dishonest party will know noth-
ing about the rest n−m bits of the other’s hash value, so
that he learns m bits of information at the most. Sum-
ming over all possible m values and recall that m = 2k
(m = 2k− 1) for dishonest Alice (Bob), the upper bound
of the average amount of mutual information leaked is
IA =
[n/2]∑
k=1
m× pmabort
=
[n/2]∑
k=1
2k cos2(k−1)(pi/8) sin2(pi/8) (5)
3FIG. 1: The average amount of information leaked IA (IB)
for dishonest Alice (Bob) as a function of the length n of the
bit-strings that they compare.
for dishonest Alice, or
IB =
[(n+1)/2]∑
k=1
m× pmabort
=
[(n+1)/2]∑
k=1
(2k − 1) cos2(k−1)(pi/8) sin2(pi/8) (6)
for dishonest Bob. Here [x] means the integer part of
x. The above IA and IB are different because our pro-
tocol is asymmetric. In the i = 1 round of step (2) Alice
prepares the qubit, and she does not announces γAi until
Bob announces γBi . Thus dishonest Alice can always en-
sure that the protocol will continue at least to the second
round. But dishonest Bob cannot completely avoid the
protocol abort in the first round, making him obtain less
information than dishonest Alice.
In Fig. 1 we show IA and IB as a function of the length
n of the bit-strings a and b being compared. Intriguingly,
the result reveals that the average amount of mutual in-
formation leaked never excesses 14 bits (for dishonest Al-
ice) or 13 bits (for dishonest Bob) for any length n of a
and b. This is because when a 6= b, the protocol stands a
very high probability to abort after merely a few rounds
of step (2). Thus the rest bits of hA and hB will remain
secret to the other party as their information are never
announced in the protocol.
Also, IA and IB are merely loose upper bounds, be-
cause in the above calculations we assumed that when
the protocol aborts at the mth round of step (2), the
cheater obtains m bits of information. But actually this
will not occur with probability 1. For example, the opti-
mal operation that can distinguish the density matrices
ργi=0 and ργi=1 with probability pmax = cos
2(pi/8) is in
fact the measurement that projects the state |γi〉hi in
the basis {cos(pi/8) |0〉0 + sin(pi/8) |1〉0 , cos(5pi/8) |0〉0 +
sin(5pi/8) |1〉0}. But this operation provides absolutely
zero knowledge on the value of hi. Other operations
(such as the honest operation in the protocol) can learn
hi with a higher probability, but result in a lower proba-
bility for distinguishing ργi=0 and ργi=1. While the num-
ber of cheating strategies could be numerous, there is no
doubt that its probability for learning hi in each round
can never exceed 1, and it can distinguish ργi=0 and ργi=1
(and thus avoid the protocol from aborting) with a prob-
ability no greater than pmax. Therefore, as our above
analysis assumes that the dishonest party can distinguish
ργi=0 and ργi=1 with the probability pmax exactly while
always know hi with certainty, the bounds IA and IB are
sufficiently general to cover any kind of cheating strate-
gies.
Moreover, note that the information leaked is not the
direct information on the strings a and b being compared,
but the information on their hash values instead. Thus
it is less useful for the cheater in practice. For example,
even if dishonest Alice knows the exact values of the first
IA bits of Bob’s h
B, it does not mean that she knows the
first IA bits of Bob’s b. There are still 2
n−IA bits of hB
remain unknown, meaning that there are 2n−IA possible
choices for b. Consequently, in general Alice can hardly
even know whether there is a > b or a < b, needless to
say other subtle properties of b, such as parity, weigh,
etc.
V. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING QPC
PROTOCOLS
As pinpointed out in Section 4 of Ref. [21] and also
in Ref. [22], many previous QPC protocols with a
third party also have a non-trivial amount of information
leaked to at least one of the parties. Most of them are
also less feasible as they require the use of entanglement,
joint measurements, and quantum memory. On the con-
trary, our protocol can easily be implemented without
these resources. For example, we can use 0◦, 90◦, 45◦,
135◦ polarized photons as the carrier of the qubit states
|0〉0, |1〉0, |0〉1, |1〉1 in the protocol, respectively. The re-
ceiver can measure them immediately, without the need
to store them. Also, in step (2) Alice and Bob send a
single qubit in each round. Once the protocol aborts,
they no longer need to send qubits to compare the rest
bits of hA and hB. The fact that the average amount
of information leaked is below 14 bits indicates that the
protocol averagely takes only 14 rounds to abort. That
is, when a 6= b, in average our protocol merely takes 14
qubits to complete the comparison, thus it is extremely
efficient. More importantly, all these are accomplished
without the need for the third party.
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